US-Iran Negotiations

Welcome to the Audere Atlas, the Audere Group’s fortnightly update on global geopolitical trends, how we engage with them, and what they mean for your organisation.

This week, we discuss the renewed US–Iran nuclear talks and what’s driving both sides back to the table. With key differences still unresolved and time running short, we explore the prospects for diplomacy, the risks of failure, and the potential implications for regional stability and global markets.

The Audere Atlas offers timely, actionable insights that both support key decision-making and highlight areas for further exploration and understanding.

Deadline Diplomacy

The Bottom Line

US–Iran nuclear negotiations have resumed amid escalating tensions, but major differences in objectives, timelines, and trust make a durable agreement highly unlikely. A rushed deal or military strike both carry severe geopolitical and commercial risks, from global energy disruption to regional war.

The Brief

The resumption of US–Iran nuclear negotiations in spring 2025 marks a critical juncture in a decades-long dispute over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The backdrop is one of heightened urgency: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assesses that Iran has stockpiled over 275kg of uranium enriched to 60%, with sufficient centrifuge capacity to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for five nuclear bombs within a week​. This proximity to a nuclear breakout has catalysed a renewed, if uneasy, dialogue.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), agreed in 2015, had once placed firm restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme. It capped uranium enrichment at 3.67% and stockpiles at 300kg, with intrusive international monitoring. However, US withdrawal under President Trump in 2018 triggered Iran’s gradual abandonment of these limits. The ensuing “maximum pressure” campaign only encouraged Tehran to accelerate enrichment and install advanced centrifuges. By 2025, the breakdown of the JCPOA had not only failed to curb Iran’s progress but had left diplomacy deeply fractured.

Recent negotiations — initiated in Muscat and Rome — have been propelled by both sides’ desire to avert conflict. Iran, battered economically and diplomatically isolated, proposed a three-phase deal offering to cap enrichment but retain its nuclear infrastructure​. The United States, however, continues to demand the elimination of Iran’s ability to weaponise, including dismantling advanced centrifuges and establishing a robust verification regime. Tehran has rejected any return to zero enrichment, citing it as anon-negotiable sovereign right​.

Talks have now progressed to the expert level, with upcoming meetings in Oman expected to focus on enrichment thresholds and verification mechanisms​. However, major gaps remain. Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, has oscillated between maximalist rhetoric and hints at compromise, while Iran insists on guarantees — especially against a repeat of US withdrawal from any future deal. This tension is reminiscent of Trump’s negotiation style in other arenas, such as Ukraine and reciprocal tariffs, where maximalist goals are publicly declared before being bartered down for swift wins aimed at boosting domestic credibility.

Meanwhile, Israel’s position has hardened. The Netanyahu government insists on the complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme — the so-called ‘Libya model’ — and reportedly views the next six months as a window of opportunity for a military strike​. Israel is preparing for potential unilateral action, and while operationally constrained without US support, its alignment with Trump’s administration signals that the threat of military confrontation remains credible. Netanyahu’s coalition has domestic political incentives to pursue deterrence through strength, but a wider war could undermine public support. With the IDF already engaged in intensive operations in Gaza and southern Syria, the risk of strategic overreach is real. Should Israel also engage Iran directly, it may find itself confronting a multi-front conflict against both asymmetric and conventional threats — a scenario that could stretch military capacity and erode domestic backing for further escalation.

Saudi Arabia, once a sceptic of the JCPOA, now cautiously supports dialogue, emphasising regional stability. This shift reflects Riyadh’s economic priorities and a desire to avoid escalation, especially after its 2023 rapprochement with Tehran. MBS appears to favour a managed de-escalation that preserves Saudi interests and prevents Iran from becoming a regional martyr or victor. The Gulf states, including the UAE, have quietly endorsed Oman’s mediation, hopeful that a peaceful resolution will maintain regional equilibrium.

The current diplomatic climate, thus, is defined by urgency, mistrust, and starkly opposed visions of an acceptable outcome.

^{Map 1: Iran’s nuclear facilities (Source/FT)}

So What?

For business leaders, the trajectory of US–Iran nuclear negotiations matters not only for regional security but also for global energy markets, supply chains, and geopolitical stability. At present, the prospects for a lasting diplomatic resolution remain bleak.

The negotiation dynamics are inherently asymmetrical. The Trump administration, seeking a swift resolution to showcase foreign policy success, has set a 60-day window for concluding talks. Tehran, on the other hand, seeks drawn-out negotiations that preserve leverage and delay military action​. This fundamental misalignment, and the Trump administration’s political preference for fast, headline-grabbing victories (evinced across multiple crises, including Ukraine and Gaza), risks pushing the US towards a hurried, fragile deal — or towards military escalation if diplomacy stalls.

A rushed or narrowly scoped agreement could have unintended consequences. It may offer temporary de-escalation but fail to constrain Iran’s longer-term capacity to reconstitute its programme. Such a deal might also deepen Iran’s tilt towards Russia and China. Already, Moscow is positioning itself as a central actor — potentially hosting Iran’s uranium stockpile and serving as arbiter of compliance​. This would not only give Russia new leverage over US policy but also sideline traditional European interlocutors. For Washington, this could mean ceding strategic influence in a region critical to global energy flows.

A weak deal could take several forms: one that lacks clarity on enrichment limits or verification; one that delays but does not dismantle Iran’s centrifuge capability; or one that grants sanctions relief without a credible mechanism to reimpose penalties for violations. Such a deal would offer short-term relief but create conditions for future breakdowns, with Iran resuming its programme once international attention shifts.

Should diplomacy fail entirely, the military option looms large. A US or Israeli strike could set Iran’s programme back but would almost certainly not eliminate it. Highly fortified sites like Fordow and Natanz, buried deep underground, would require sustained bombing campaigns with uncertain success​. Retaliation from Iran would follow — likely via regional proxies, cyberattacks, and missile strikes on Gulf infrastructure — triggering wider instability across the Middle East. The potential for Iranian retaliation is heightened by the current weakened but resilient network of proxies and the Iranian regime’s need to demonstrate strength domestically.

^{Image 1: Nantaz underground nuclear facility(Source/AP)}

For global markets, this would mean soaring energy prices, supply chain shocks, and volatility in risk-sensitive sectors such as aviation, logistics, and insurance. Firms with regional exposure would need to consider contingency plans. Conversely, a meaningful and durable diplomatic agreement could stabilise oil markets, reduce shipping risk in the Strait of Hormuz, and open the door — eventually — to limited Iranian reintegration into global trade.

Still, even a successful negotiation would not offer immediate economic dividends. Due to reputational risk and complex sanctions architecture, major banks and corporates are unlikely to re-engage with Iran quickly​. The phenomenon of “de-risking” — avoiding even legal transactions with Iranian entities — remains a powerful brake on commercial normalisation.

In sum, the stakes are high and the risks manifold. Negotiation remains the least bad option. But absent political will and realistic expectations on both sides, the most likely outcome is either a temporary fudge or escalation — neither of which resolves the underlying crisis, and both of which carry significant costs for global business.

Keen to Know More?

The Audere Group is an intelligence and risk advisory firm offering integrated solutions to companies in complex situations.

We specialise in mitigating the financial, reputational and physical risks faced by our clients in markets across the world through a 360-degree range of services incorporating security advisory, crisis management and strategic intelligence to inform decision making around transactions, supply chains and disputes.

Contact us to learn how our bespoke risk advisory services can work with your unique circumstances to navigate high-risk environments and changing landscapes through the provision of hard-to-reach intelligence and clear analysis.

_{Disclaimer: The content of this report is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal or financial advice. For further details or specific inquiries, please reach out to our team directly.}