Welcome to the inaugural issue of the Audere Atlas, the Audere Group’s fortnightly update on global geopolitical trends, how we are engaging with them, and what they mean for your organisation.

In this first issue, we delve into the rapidly evolving dynamics in the Levant, exploring the potential implications not only for Middle Eastern geopolitics, but for broader issues spanning Russia’s war on Ukraine and the upcoming US Presidential election.

Our aim is for the Audere Atlas to offer timely, actionable insights that both support key decision-making and highlight areas for further exploration and understanding.

A Closer Look at a Destabilising Levant

The Levant is experiencing heightened instability as a confluence of military actions, diplomatic manoeuvres, and ongoing fractious negotiations increase the risk of an all-out regional war. This would wreak havoc on energy and shipping markets, with severe knock-on effects for the global economy.

While the same headline could have been printed at almost any point since 07 October 2023, nearly a year later, the region remains in a continued state of peril over the conflict in Gaza’s potential to escalate to a regional war. This is all the more the case following the sabotage of Hezbollah’s electronic communications, injuring thousands of its members across Lebanon and the wider region and setting the stage for Israeli military operations against the group.

In many respects, the conflict is already regional. Early attacks, launched in solidarity with Hamas by Iranian proxies in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, initially raised fears of wider escalation as early as late 2023, but this was avoided, despite Israeli, US, and UK retaliatory strikes. That was until Israel bombed an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus in April 2024, eliciting an Iranian response in the form of an unprecedented direct attack on Israel.

The limited nature of the attack, and of Israel’s retaliation prompted sighs of relief, until a pair of brazen Israeli operations in late July succeeded in eliminating Hezbollah’s second-in-command and Hamas’s political leader in the same week. Both Iran and Hezbollah promised vengeance, and while Hezbollah mustered a lacklustre response in late August—dampened by pre-emptive Israeli strikes on its launch sites—Iran is yet to make its move.

Why the wait?

Hostage negotiations, offering hope of a temporary wind-up of fighting in Gaza, and with it, Israeli détente with Hezbollah and Iran, have continued over the summer. Despite Hamas’s non-attendance to the most recent talks in Cairo, the spectre of an Iranian attack, renewed enthusiasm from Washington, and constant pressure at home—recently manifested by mass demonstrations and a general strike in early September—have piled pressure on Tel Aviv to find an agreement. Netanyahu’s insistence on Israel maintaining control over the Gazan border with Egypt, in direct contradiction to Hamas’s demand for the full withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Strip, had been a stumbling block.

That being said, it may yet prove irrelevant after the deaths of six Israeli hostages’ mere hours before their rescue by Israeli forces on 31 August, which threatens to scupper the current deal.

Now, following Israel’s overt escalation in the form of its alleged sabotage of Hezbollah’s electronic communications devices—the simultaneous detonation of thousands of which incapacitated over 4,000 operatives, as well as the Iranian ambassador and various IRGC personnel—has set the stage for the opening of a new front in Lebanon. It has likewise rendered further Hezbollah retaliation highly likely, and Iranian involvement a very realistic possibility.

Shifting to a more nuanced commentary, Audere is sceptical that a hostage deal is realistic. The ascension to Hamas’ leadership of the hardline Yahiya Sinwar, and the somewhat contradictory nature of Israel’s twin war aims of destroying Hamas while securing the release of all Israeli hostages suggests a challenging path ahead. We assess that Netanyahu will use the recent hostage deaths, growing West Bank militancy (reportedly facilitated and encouraged by Iran), and the latest escalation by Tehan’s proxies—namely the Houthis’ firing a hypersonic missile at Tel Aviv in mid-September, and promises by Iraqi groups to follow suit—to redouble Israel’s military campaign before the first anniversary of 7 October. This is despite domestic protests, and in recognition of the lack of public pressure from US leaders (Biden, Harris, and Trump included) which in turn indicates a tacit international acceptance of this policy.

Equally, following the Israeli cabinet’s decision, on 16 September, to endorse the “returning the residents of the North securely to their homes” as a war objective, there is a realistic possibility the sabotage sought to lay the ground for achieving this militarily. With thousands of Hezbollah fighters debilitated and leadership in disarray, the context for ground operations appears favourable. International airlines have taken note, temporarily suspending flights to the region.

The nature of the Gaza conflict and its interdependencies on wider regional tensions implies that the failure to secure a deal will likely exacerbate the likelihood and severity of violent pan-region contagion.

Whether this will encourage a more substantial Iranian response, inspire increased action from Iran’s proxies against Israel and its allies, or advance the opening of a new front on the northern Israeli border remains uncertain. (The recent Houthi hypersonic missile attack and rumours of the imminent replacement of Israel’s Minister of Defence, an opponent of escalation with Hezbollah, suggest the latter two scenarios are somewhat probable.) What is certain is that the broader negative effects of regional tensions to date, including the disruption to global shipping through the Red Sea due to Houthi attacks and the strain on regional economies, will undoubtedly persist if not deteriorate further.

For the US and Israel’s other allies, it also means more instability at home as the conflict continues to divide political communities. Support for Israel has split the Democratic party, damaging and diluting Harris’s campaign (despite efforts to take a more ‘balanced’ approach to the conflict than the Biden-led strategy). While this shift has helped Harris gain ground in key election states like Michigan, Arizona, and North Carolina, broader conflict is likely to further Trump’s isolationist rhetoric in the build-up to the November ballot.

The conflict’s escalation also offers adversaries like Russia and China an opportunity. At the informational level, opportunistic propaganda highlighting US support for Israel’s Gaza policy, has helped to galvanise anti-American, and more broadly anti-Western sentiment—‘Whataboutism’ notwithstanding. In more kinetic terms, the deployment of significant US military assets to the Middle East threatens American readiness to support allies in other theatres, from Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific. Perhaps most at stake is Ukraine, which has already suffered from an attention deficit since 7 October and is battling daily Russian advances despite its daring incursion into Kursk, although allies in Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines will likewise fret.

A wider conflict, drawing in regional state actors and their international allies, carries the additional risk of energy market disruption—ranging from the kind of inflation witnessed by European nations following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, to a full-blown stagflationary recession akin to that suffered in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, when OPEC’s Arab states boycotted the West over its support for Israel.

Keen to know more?

The evolving geopolitical landscape presents both challenges and opportunities. Organisations operating in or with ties to the Middle East need to evaluate the potential impact of ongoing conflicts on their operations, including supply chain disruptions, shifts in regulatory environments, and fluctuations in energy prices. Proactive strategies, including forming strategic alliances and investing in robust risk management solutions, will be crucial for navigating these uncertainties.

The Audere Group offers tailored risk advisory services to help businesses manage the complexities of operating in volatile environments. Our integrated intelligence, investigations, and security teams offer actionable insights, enabling clients to anticipate and respond to emerging risks effectively. Having supported clients since 2014, our team of experts is equipped to offer the strategic analysis and risk advisory services necessary to navigate these challenging times.

Get in touch

Contact us to learn more about how our bespoke services can help you safeguard your interests and capitalise on new opportunities.

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