The Levant’s Widening War

Welcome to the Audere Atlas, the Audere Group’s fortnightly update on global geopolitical trends, how we engage with them, and what they mean for your organisation.

This week, we assess how the war between the US, Israel and Iran is reshaping the Levant. As fighting intensifies in Lebanon and pressure builds on Syria, Iraq and Jordan, the region’s most fragile states risk becoming the next arena of escalation.

The Audere Atlas offers timely, actionable insights that support decision-making and highlight areas for further exploration.

The Bottom Line

The expansion of Israel’s  campaign into Lebanon and mounting pressure on Syria and Iraq from Iran-linked  militia risk destabilising the Levant. Weak governance, sectarian tension and  proliferating non-state actors will drive sustained insecurity as long as the war rages and beyond. For business, while a changing region offers opportunity,  the Levant that is emerging is one of heightened operational risk.

The Brief

While the downstream effects on global markets grab headlines, the regional war centred on Iran is increasingly spilling westward into the Levant. 

In Lebanon, Israel has significantly deepened its ground campaign against Hizbollah, deploying multiple divisions and advancing several kilometres beyond the border. Plans to establish a “security zone” north of the Litani river – potentially encompassing up to a tenth of Lebanese territory – suggest a prolonged military presence rather than a limited incursion.

^{Image: IDF map in Arabic indicating evacuation zones for Lebanese citizens beyond the Litani river}

This escalation is already producing severe humanitarian and political strain. Over one million people have been displaced, with Israeli forces repeatedly ordering civilians further north. The destruction of infrastructure, including bridges and towns, alongside Hizbollah rocket fire into northern Israel, points to a sustained, attritional campaign. While Hezbollah rocket and drone attacks do not appear to be achieving the desired effect of altering Israel’s decision-making in conducting airstrikes against Iran, the IDF estimates that Hezbollah can maintain a fire rate of 200 rockets and drone launches per day at Israel for an additional five months.

Crucially, there is no clear Israeli timeline for withdrawal, raising  the prospect of a long-term occupation reminiscent of 1982–2000. IDF Chief  of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir told the mayor of the northern Israeli city of  Nahariya that the military will not leave southern Lebanon until the threat of  Hezbollah is removed.

^{Image: IDF soldier holds up a  Hezbollah flag found during clearing operations in South Lebanon}

Domestically, Lebanon is fracturing. Hizbollah’s decision to engage Israel has triggered widespread backlash beyond its core Shia base. Political actors – including elements of the Amal movement and Christian factions – have criticised the group for dragging the country into a war aligned with Iranian interests. Rising sectarian tension, combined with the mass displacement of largely Shia populations into Sunni, Christian and Druze areas, risks reigniting communal violence.

In parallel, the Lebanese state is attempting a delicate repositioning. Moves to curtail Hizbollah’s military role and explore talks with Israel mark a historic shift, but one that risks provoking internal confrontation. The state remains weak, under-resourced and unable to enforce its authority nationwide.

Syria, meanwhile, is attempting to maintain neutrality but is increasingly exposed. The government faces cross-border attacks from Iraqi Shia militias and intermittent Israeli strikes, while also confronting internal instability. President Ahmed al-Sharaa has deployed forces to secure borders and limit militant flows, but his capacity to do so remains limited after years of civil war. Despite efforts to reposition Syria as a neutral actor with improving ties to Arab and Western states, the country risks being drawn into the conflict through militia activity, Israeli intervention, or miscalculation. 

Iraq and Jordan face similar pressures, as Iranian-aligned groups expand operations in their territory, and both states suffer direct Iranian attacks and supply chain strain. The result is a Levant that is no longer peripheral to the Iran war, but increasingly central to the next phase of the regional conflagration. The war in Iraq between 2003 and 2011 had destabilising effects that can still be felt across all countries in the region. The current war has already spread to new fronts and follows two and a half years of US-Israeli strikes on Iran and its partners in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria and Iraq. In its latest phase, no country in the region has been left unscathed, and the consequences of the war are now intensifying in the Levant.

So What?

For businesses, the Levant’s deterioration presents a complex mix of risk and opportunity shaped by three dynamics: reconfiguration, fragmentation and insecurity.

First, the conflict is accelerating a reconfiguration of regional trade and energy flows, creating selective opportunity. Disruption in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz has intensified the search for alternative export routes. Syria is seeking to position itself as a transit corridor linking the Gulf to the Mediterranean, with early signs of Iraqi overland fuel exports via Syrian territory. President Ahmed al-Sharaa has actively pitched Syria as a logistics and energy hub to European partners, highlighting its potential role in maintaining supply chains as maritime routes come under pressure. However, these opportunities are highly contingent on security conditions that remain fragile. Israeli strikes on Syrian territory, militia activity along key routes, and the country’s degraded infrastructure all constrain scalability. Any expansion of Israeli operations or renewed insurgency could quickly undermine confidence and deter sustained capital inflow.

Second, governance fragmentation will increase operational uncertainty. In Lebanon, the combination of mass displacement and rising sectarian tension is already straining local governance structures. The relocation of largely Shia populations into Sunni, Christian and Druze areas also risks sparking communal violence, particularly as resentment towards Hizbollah grows. Political fragmentation is deepening while the state itself lacks the capacity to enforce decisions, including recent moves to curtail the group’s military role. In Syria, state authority remains limited. Damascus has deployed forces to its borders to stem the flow of fighters and weapons, but lacks the capacity to control its territory fully nor to halt its use by proxy forces of parties to the wider regional conflict. For operators, this translates into an environment where authority is diffuse, decision-making is localised, and access depends on navigating overlapping formal and informal power structures.

^{Image: screenshot from Hezbollah’s first FPV drone attack on an Israeli tank}

Third, asymmetric threats will proliferate and become more technologically sophisticated. Hizbollah has demonstrated continued operational capability despite Israeli pressure, including the use of first-person-view (FPV) drones against Israeli forces. This cheap and effective tactic developed in Ukraine could broaden the scope of militant targets even as their conventional strength is weakened. More broadly, Iran and its partners are showing increasing coordination across theatres. A coordinated strike on 6 April involving Iran, Hizbollah and the Houthis highlighted the potential for synchronised, multi-vector attacks designed to maximise psychological and operational impact. Iraqi Shia militias are also expanding their activity, including attacks on Iraqi oil assets. These dynamics elevate risks to critical infrastructure, shipping, energy assets and personnel across the Levant.

At the same time, latent threats, most notably ISIS, remain poised to exploit governance gaps. Recent attacks on US and allied positions in Syria, including insider-style operations, underscore the group’s continued intent and capability. Any deterioration in state control or security force cohesion could provide the conditions for ISIS to reconstitute networks, further complicating the operating environment and undermining stabilisation efforts.

For firms with exposure to the Levant, this is an environment that demands active risk management rather than passive monitoring. Security conditions will be fluid, local dynamics will vary sharply, and exposure to non-state actors will increase.

Audere Group supports clients operating in high-risk environments through integrated intelligence and security solutions. From HUMINT-led risk assessments and in-country network mapping to operational security, crisis response and supply chain monitoring, we enable organisations to navigate complex threat environments, protect assets and identify viable opportunities in volatile markets.

Keen to Know More?

The Audere Group is an intelligence and risk advisory firm offering integrated solutions to companies in complex situations.

We specialise in mitigating the financial, reputational and physical risks faced by our clients in markets across the world through a 360-degree range of services incorporating security advisory, crisis management and strategic intelligence to inform decision making around transactions, supply chains and disputes.

Contact us to learn how our bespoke risk advisory services can work with your unique circumstances to navigate high-risk environments and changing landscapes through the provision of hard-to-reach intelligence and clear analysis.

_{Disclaimer: The content of this report is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal or financial advice. For further details or specific inquiries, please reach out to our team directly.}